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TO THE PRETTY GENTLEMEN OF WHITEHALL.

*On the late Negotiations with
France, relative to her designs
with regard to Spain.*

Kensington, 16 April 1823.

PRETTY GENTLEMEN,

THERE you are, then, as pretty a set of gentlemen as any nation need wish to see in possession of its purse; and here are we, as stupid looking, as silly looking, as gaping and as mortified a people as the world ever beheld. We appear to have been made *for you*, and you *for us*. To men of information, it was visible enough, that France was *rising* above us; that she was becoming *rich* at our expense; that hers was the country to go to, and ours the country to quit; that she had gained enormously by her revolution; that her tithes, her game-laws, her

feudal tenures and taxes were all swept away; that her agriculture was flourishing beyond description; and that, in short, a *few years*, would see her ready to avenge the insults which she received at the hands of her "*conquerors*" in 1815. This was visible enough to men of information; and, for my part, I saw it with great pleasure; because the insults of 1815 were offered to every *man on earth* who was not either an oppressor or a willing slave. I, remembering the language of the tax and tithe-eaters of that day, could not refrain from rejoicing at the prospect of seeing the French people obtain vengeance. I confidently expected to see it; but, I did not expect to see it *so soon*.

There you are, then, Pretty Gentlemen, sucking your thumbs, while the French are actually on the highway to Madrid. Your *Papers* exhibit you, and the country which is under your power, in a pretty light. It shall be my business to put on record a history

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of your conduct upon this occasion; because the facts of to-day will, in a few years' time, be as valuable as the facts of 1815 are now. Mr. Canning said he would tell a plain, unvarnished tale; but, I will tell a plainer: I will rub from his tale that very varnish which he said he would not put on.

The great and undisguisable fact is this: *France has marched to take possession of Spain against the wishes and prayers of England; and England stirs no hand or foot to prevent it.* This is the fact; and a disgraceful fact it is for England. Let us see, then, how you, to whom the affairs, to whose keeping the honour and the interest of England is committed; let us see what apology you have to offer for this. Let us see your reasons for standing and looking on in this case; you, too, who seemed never to have enough of war. Let us hear what you have to say for yourselves.

The case is this: Spain was invaded by Buonaparte, and actually surrendered to him by her King. We sent fleets and armies to assist the Spaniards to drive out Buonaparte's brother whom Buonaparte had appointed to be King of Spain. The Spanish people formed a new Constitution in 1812, while we were fighting with

them. This Constitution was acknowledged by us. In 1814, Buonaparte being put down, the King of Spain returned to his throne. He soon destroyed the Constitution which his brave people had formed and which we had acknowledged. In 1820, however, the people revolted, and re-established the Constitution which they had before formed and which we had acknowledged.

Thus things remained until last Spring, when the French collected an army at the foot of the mountains which separate Spain from France. They called this a *health-army*; that is to say, an army to prevent persons having the contagious fever (then prevailing in Spain) from bringing that fever into France. This was so barefaced a lie, that to pretend to have believed it is a thing meriting condign punishment. You must have known what the object of that army was. It is now openly avowed by the French, that they were, from the moment this army was collected, engaged in giving succour to those in Spain who were in arms against the new Constitution, and who called themselves the *Army of the Faith*. What were you at, if you did not know what this army of France was at? However, the French,

in the month of September, dropped the ridiculous name, and called their army, an *Army of Observation*; that is to say, an army to watch an enemy! Still not a word did you say! No complaint did you make; and not even a question did you ask of the French, of whom you appear to have stood in as much awe as the farmers stand in with regard to the parson-justices. What! See a French Army of Observation lying close on the borders of Spain; hear it called an army of observation; and not ask; not just ask the Bourbons what they mean? If you had asked this during last Summer, the Great Duke would not have gone in the dark to Verona. But, you did not dare ask this simple question: *What is that army for?* There the army remained, then; and, even in the month of August, while the name of army *sanitaire* was still used, it was easy to see where the thing was intended to end. I say, it was easy to see; because, I saw it, and, in that month, I, in both my publications, endeavoured to awaken the public to a sense of the danger. Yet you, Pretty Gentlemen as you are, could see nothing of all this; though, besides your enormous sums to envoys, you have fifty thousand

pounds voted you for a year's secret service money! All the nations in Europe do not pay so much for such services; and yet, nothing do you appear to have known of what was going on at the foot of the Pyrenees.

In September the Holy Allies assembled in Congress at Verona. The Great Duke was our Envoy. — But, how came we to have an envoy there? We were told, that our King did not belong to the Holy Alliance. Yet, when they met, we had an envoy amongst them. This envoy does not appear, indeed, to have had much weight; but, all the while he was there; and, how he came there, if our King did not belong to the Holy Alliance, is odd enough. This Holy Alliance was, as Castlereagh said, the invention of Pitt: it was Pitt's plan, he said: and, it is curious enough, that this Holy Alliance should have given the Pitt-system the first blow from abroad! The Holy Alliance is like a good many other people: as long as you can give them money, they are kind enough; but, cease to do that, and, especially, let them discover that you are unable to do it, and they treat you with very little ceremony.

The Papers relating to this at once ridiculous and dismal affair

are voluminous ; but, that which they show, and which is worthy of our attention, lies in a very small compass. At some future time I will show what pretty *writing* the Great Captain's is. Whether as a *fighter* he beat all the world, I do not know ; but, as a *writer*, let the world match him if they can. I call upon the People of England to look at *his paper of the 30th October*, and at his *memorandum* to the "Lord Charles" that he sent to Spain with his advice ; I call upon the People of England to look at these papers, and then consider *what they pay* annually to ambassadors ! However, I must take another opportunity to give some specimens of this Great Captain's *writing*. At present we have to do with the thing itself, and not with the manner of it ; though I cannot refrain from observing here, that a nation which employs such agents, merits such results. Mr. Brougham, in the debate on these Papers, called Monsieur CHATEAUBRIAND a writer of *bad books* and of *worse speeches* ; and he called the French Ministers *imbeciles*. Now, I hold it to be very bad taste to go on in this way, and to keep silent as to the *talents* of our own *employés*. —Did Monsieur Chateaubriand ever write any thing equal to the

papers that I have just pointed out ? Have the French Ministers stood sucking their thumbs while we marched to take possession of a neighbouring kingdom ? I do not like this attacking of those who *cannot hurt you*, and taking care not to attack those who *can hurt you*. This is our *liberty of the press*. We have *full liberty* to attack all that our borough-mongers and their agents wish to have attacked ; but, if we attack those which our boroughmongers wish to screen, we must look sharp for the consequences.

However, let us leave the *manner* of the negotiation (if such it can be called) aside, for the present ; and let us take a look at the thing itself, which may be fully described in a few propositions, thus :—That, in September last, the Great Duke went to Verona ; that, being at Paris, on his way thither, he found that the French meant to call upon the Allies for a declaration relative to Spain ;—that he communicated this news to Mr. Canning ;—that Mr. Canning instantly instructed him, "at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that, to *any interference* in the affairs of Spain, come what may, His Majesty *will not be a party* ;"—that the French called upon the Allies to say what they

would do in case France recalled her ambassador from Spain, or went to war;—that the Great Duke *declined giving any answer* as to what England would do;—that the other Allies agreed at once to assist France against Spain in all sorts of ways;—that the *Great Captain*, being at Paris, on his way back, saw the French Minister, and that Minister, in consequence of conversations with him, sent to Verona to suspend the measures for recalling the ambassadors from Madrid;—that things now wore a more pacific aspect;—that the Great Duke sent off his friend Lord FITZROY SOMERSET, to try to persuade the Spaniards to alter their constitution;—that this did not succeed;—that a great deal of talk about this took place at Madrid;—that we offered our mediation to the French, who resolutely rejected it, and that the Spaniards did the same, upon its being offered to them;—that until the moment of the French King's making his speech to the Chambers, our Ministers appear to have believed that the French wish for peace;—that they believe the same still, notwithstanding the King's speech;—that it was not until towards the latter end of March that they would appear to have discover-

ed the real intentions of the French.

Such is the substance of this pretty story. Are we to look upon you, Pretty Gentlemen of Whitehall, as the vilest of hypocrites, or as amongst the silliest of men? One or the other you must be; for, is it possible for you not to have perceived, from the very beginning, that the French and the Allies, intended war? Is it possible for you not to have perceived this, if you had had only as much sense as the most ignorant of the labouring people? The French asked the Allies, what they will do, in case the French should go to war with Spain; and the Allies all answer, we will assist you with all our might, in all sorts of ways. Now could any one believe, that the French would not avail themselves of this offer? A man must have been mad to suppose for a moment, that the French would reject such an offer as this. Surprising, therefore, must have been your credulity, if you really were the dupes upon this occasion.

The real fact, however, I take to be this. You did see, you must have seen, that the French were resolved on war, and that the Allies were resolved to assist them if necessary. I say, without

any hesitation that you must have seen this ; because it was proved to you in the Statesman newspaper. You hate the paper, and hate the writer ; but still, for your own sakes, you read. You yourselves knew what was passing at the Congress ; and you must have been curious to see what was said about it in a newspaper that seemed to have some dealings with the devil upon the occasion. In short, you must have seen this newspaper. And the reasoning which it contained, coupled with the facts which were so well known to you, must have convinced you, that the French were bent upon war.

You knew that they were bent upon war ; you knew that nothing but *threatened war* on your part would prevent the invasion of Spain ; and from the very outset, you declared that *nothing should make you go to war*. Mr. BROUGHAM ascribed to Mr. CANNING having said that this war was a *desperate* enterprise on the part of the French. Mr. CANNING qualified this, and said that the word desperate did not apply. Desperate would apply, however, extremely well, to your declarations with respect to peace. If the French were not desperately bent on war, you were, at any

rate, desperately bent on peace. I have more than once observed on the entirely new tone of the King of England's speeches to the Parliament. For many Sessions, he has begun his speeches with expressing his great satisfaction at his continuing to receive the strongest assurances of the pacific disposition of foreign powers towards him. I have more than once told you that it was bad policy to make this so prominent a matter in the King's speech. I have more than once told you that it was the way to produce war ; and though it may not have done a great deal, this very *persiflage*, has done something towards producing the invasion of Spain. You could not go to war. I knew that a great many people in England knew that ; but all the world did not know it. The French Government, though they must know the state of your affairs pretty well, could not be quite sure of it ; and therefore, if you had not, as Mr. BARING says, *flung away your cause*, war between France and Spain might possibly have been avoided. However, the fact is, that the war is to be ascribed to the knowledge which the French and the allies had of your inability to go to war.

This knowledge they certainly, in some measure, owe to me. From the time of your rejoicings in 1814; from the time, indeed, of my receiving that treatment at your hands which I shall not now describe, I took pains to explain to the *world*, that you never could go to war again. This I have taken infinite pains to prove to the whole world. Mr. WILLIAM LAMBE said, on Wednesday night, that members should take care how they heaped personal abuse, upon the French Ministers and others; and he reminded them, that Doctor FRANKLIN signed the treaty of Paris, which took thirteen colonies from England. He reminded them that the Doctor signed that treaty, in the same coat which he wore at the time when WEDDERBUNNE, the English Attorney General, was abusing him, before the Lords of the Privy Council in London. This was a very good anecdote, and I beg leave to tell Mr. LAMBE that I have now got the same coat that I had on, when I heard SIDMOUTH tell the Lords that he had shown all the cheap publications to the Law Officers, and that he was *sorry to say that they could find nothing in them to prosecute*. And what of that? Mr. LAMBE and you will say, why, it is not

that I have any treaties to sign as you and Doctor FRANKLIN had; but you will acknowledge that I have some Registers to sign, and you will say a great deal, before you will deprive me of the satisfaction of believing that those Registers have greatly contributed towards producing those things which give you pain and which give me pleasure. I know that I removed from the mind of the American Government the apprehensions that it entertained of your hostility, if it acknowledged the independence of South America. The question was put to me in 1818, whether I thought there was danger of your attacking the United States, if they acknowledged South American independence. My answer was that you could not go to war; that you never could go to war again without a blowing up of the debt; and that you could not blow that up, without blowing the boroughs to atoms. This, said I, they will never do, as long as they can possibly make the thing hold together. They will suffer any thing rather than do this; and, therefore, you may safely acknowledge the independence of the South American States. In an Essay, urging the Americans to this acknowledgment, I have this pas-

sage: " Oh! no. There can no
 " war arise to America from
 " taking part with the Spanish
 " Patriots. The Government of
 " England is the only enemy
 " worth thinking about; and, God
 " be praised, that Government is
 " now in a state to be unable to
 " undertake any mischievous war.
 " BURKE might rise from the
 " dead. With the assent and as-
 " sistance of the devil, he may, for
 " any thing that I know to the
 " contrary, be brought back upon
 " earth to cry for war and blood,
 " in order to prevent slaves from
 " becoming free in any part of
 " the world, lest the example
 " should operate to the disadvan-
 " tage of the boroughmongers in
 " England. Brought back upon
 " the earth, and labouring as he
 " did before, I have no doubt
 " that he would have enough to
 " prompt and to back him again,
 " and to make the nation pay
 " him after he was dead; but I
 " defy the boroughmongers, with
 " the devil at their back, to fur-
 " nish forth the means for car-
 " rying on a second crusade,
 " against the liberties of man-
 " kind."

This was written when I was
 upon the spot; when I had op-
 portunities of more than one kind,
 of endeavouring to impress my

opinions upon the minds of men
 of influence in America. By con-
 versation, by letter, private as well
 as public, did I labour to convince
 such persons, that they had no-
 thing to apprehend from the Eng-
 lish Government on account of
 their acknowledgment of the in-
 dependence of the South Ame-
 rican States. - Mr. PLUNKETT,
 who lately filed the ex-officio in-
 formations in Ireland; this law-
 maker, during the season of Six
 Acts, said that the people stood in
 need of being restrained more
 than formerly, seeing that they
 had now got so near to the Go-
 vernment. He said that formerly
 they were content to smoke their
 pipes and drink their drink quiet-
 ly; but that now, they read news-
 papers and other publications;
 that they began to understand
 matters of state, and that, there-
 fore, it was necessary to alter the
 law, in order to restrain them.
 This restraining work could not
 reach me, while I was in Ameri-
 ca; and, therefore, I took the
 liberty, (having still in my posses-
 sion the same coat in which I
 heard SIDMOUTH express his sor-
 row), to make my ground good;
 and to produce a perfect convic-
 tion in the mind of the American
 Government, that *you could not*
go to war; and that, therefore,

they might, without the smallest scruple, receive the cession of the Floridas and acknowledge South American independence at the same time. I have no doubt that my representations had an effect upon their conduct; and that it hastened the acknowledgment, on the part of the United States. What part of this was to be ascribed to SIDMOUTH I know not; nor does it much signify; but I am quite satisfied, that his speech, which really was the thing that sent me to America, has produced a great many important consequences in this world.

To return, then, to the French, they and the allies must have been satisfied from the beginning, that you never meant to go to war. Mr. Canning's very first despatch to the Great Duke was quite enough to convince all the parties of this. All that Mr. CANNING says is that the *King will not be a party* to any interference against the Spaniards. This was as much as to say that he would not stir hand or foot to prevent it. To say that you would not be a party to the doing of a thing, is very nearly to say that you approve of its being done by others. The bare idea of the King's being a party to an attack upon Spain; this bare thought is so degrading, that, as Lord FOLKE-

STONE observed, one lets the paper drop, with shame and indignation. Then comes the questions of the French to the allies. The answer of the Great Captain is certainly such a thing as never was read before in all this world. It approves; it makes a voluntary approval of the stationing the French army on the frontiers of Spain; and it concludes without saying one word in disapprobation of the questions put to the allies by the French. All that it says is this, that the King of England wishes the invasion of Spain not to take place, and that he feels convinced that the King of France will find the means of preventing the necessity of such invasion.

This is all; and what were the French Ministers to gather from this, but your consciousness of an inability to go to war? They knew how many provoking and cutting circumstances belonged to this invasion. In the first place, there was the acquisition of such a country. There was the taking of this country without *either with your leave or by your leave*. There was a manifest extension of the power of France. There was a grand movement of a French army. The displaying of the whiskers there, while the whiskers here were comparatively curled

up, was not a pleasant thing to think about. The marching and taking of Spain, from which the French had been so recently driven by the English, was a thing to mortify the people of England, who had hitherto been duped into a belief that they were actually conquerors of France. Then there was the Great Captain himself: it was, in some sort, taking his country away from him. In short, you felt, and the French saw, that you would cut a very sorry figure, if they invaded and took possession of Spain. They saw that the mortification would go to your very souls. It was necessary, therefore, that they should be well assured that you *could not go to war*. Your disposition they knew. It was your ability that they had to attend to. To this they appear to have attended: they appear to have made a just estimate of your powers; and the result has been, that which we now behold.

Now, then, let us see, what is your defence. You acknowledge that the Bourbons are guilty of an unjustifiable aggression; you next tell us that the King has exhausted his endeavours to prevent war between France and Spain; you declare that you wish the Spaniards success. You say that they have your *prayers* to assist them. Why,

then, did you not make use of your power? Why did you declare, from the very beginning, that you would not go to war? Why did you suffer these expressions to find their way into a despatch dated three months back? —

“We wish for peace, therefore, in Europe: but peace for ourselves we are DETERMINED, AT ALL EVENTS, to preserve.”

This is in a despatch sent to Spain, by Mr. CANNING; and, lest the Spaniards should still hope for some assistance, Mr. CANNING adds that it cannot be stated too clearly nor pressed too strongly, that England will not, on any account, be drawn into the war. He goes on to say that some may think, “that the anxiety which we manifest to rescue Spain from the war is an earnest of a *determination to join her in the war*, if it should come upon her.” But, says he, “I have discouraged in the most decisive manner, some obscure indications of a wish and a hope of this kind in the Spanish Mission in this country.”

How *desperate*, then, was the resolution to live at peace! How *resolved*! What a brave Ministry! Nothing they say is so obstinate and so desperate as real downright cowardice. Here is a resolution to keep at peace, let

what may happen. Not to draw the sword for the sake of that, about which the King and the People were so anxious! Do any thing but draw the sword. Send to advise the Spaniards to give way; beg and pray of the French; and even say a few things, the truth of which is not easily proved. But not draw the sword. Let us now hear, then, from the lips of the Prime Minister, who, as Lord FOLKESTONE most aptly observed the other night, wears upon his breast, the star given him on account of the unexampled height of glory and power, at which the nation had arrived under his sway: let us hear from him, from the lips of this Prime Minister, what are the *reasons* for this most desperate adherence to peace. Mankind never heard of so desperate a resolution to remain at peace before. The Quakers say that it is the *second blow that makes the battle*. And that, therefore, to return a blow, is more wicked than to give the first blow. You, Pretty Gentlemen, seem to have become a sort of Quakers; for, you stand a cussing with all the fortitude of a woolpack. Well, then, what are these reasons which the Prime Minister, who is also First Lord of the Treasury,

gives for this desperate determination to remain at peace? He does not acknowledge that *he has not the means of going to war*; he makes no acknowledgment of that kind; but let us, then, hear his story. The French have been guilty of aggression; they are not justified in what they were doing; the French ought not to succeed; we pray that they may not; our King has done his utmost to prevent the invasion; he has done all he can do without going to war; war would have prevented the invasion; and now let us hear from the Prime Minister, why he did not go to war. War would not have been necessary. In the opinion of ninety-nine men out of a hundred, to have expressed a determination to go to war would have been enough. To be sure, we must have been ready for war, if the threat had not succeeded. Ninety-nine men out of a hundred think that the threat would have succeeded: the threat was not put forth, because we were resolved not to go to war on any account; or, to make use of Mr. CANNING'S expression; "*Peace for ourselves we are determined, at all events, to preserve.*" The threat was not put forth because this was our desperate resolution; and now we are going to hear,

from the Prime Minister, why this desperate resolution was taken.

"It might be expected that
 " *he should state the reasons why*
 " *neutrality was the policy of this*
 " *country.* The first thing to be
 " considered was, what were the
 " *true interests of England con-*
 " *sidered as herself,* not upon any
 " narrow ground, but upon a
 " broad national principle; and
 " he would now say, that if the
 " honour or the essential interests
 " of this country should render it
 " necessary to engage in war, *we*
 " *had the means of carrying it on*
 " *with vigour,* and, he trusted,
 " ultimately with success. He
 " did not say generally or loosely,
 " that a country like England
 " could never be without the
 " means of carrying on a war
 " for the protection of her honour
 " or her interests; but *from*
 " *the situation which he had the*
 " *honour to fill,* he had an op-
 " portunity of examining, in
 " detail, the resources of the
 " country, and he had now no
 " hesitation in saying, that if the
 " honour or the interests of this
 " country rendered war necessary,
 " he should feel no difficulty in
 " *providing the means for carrying*
 " *it on;* but when he said this, he
 " must also say, that *after a war,*
 " *unexampled in its magnitude,*

and unexampled in its duration
 " —after *all the sufferings* which
 " this country *had endured,* at a
 " moment like the present, when
 " our commerce and manufactures
 " *enjoyed a degree of prosperity*
 " *which they had never before at-*
 " *tained,* every rational man must
 " feel that a *continuance of peace*
 " *was most desirable,* if peace
 " could be maintained consistently
 " with the honour and the essential
 " interests of the nation; and that
 " we ought not to *throw into the*
 " *hands of other countries* the
 " advantages which we now enjoy,
 " which we must infallibly do in
 " some degree, if war, (no matter
 " under what circumstances)
 " should take place."

I beg the reader to pay attention to all the words of this passage, which is as pretty a little thing as ever came from any of you. In the first place, here is a declaration that we had the means of going to war. Here we have a declaration, that if war were to become necessary, this great stern-path-of-duty man is able to find *ample means for carrying it on with vigour!* That I do not believe him every body knows very well; and another thing is, I am satisfied that no man in the kingdom, who is not an idiot, does believe him. It is pretty good, to

be sure, in him to expect that we shall believe him because he is the First Lord of the Treasury.—

"*From the situation which he had the honour to fill*, he had an opportunity of examining in detail the resources of the country."—

So! because he is Lord of the Treasury, he is to understand about the resources of the country! It is a pretty deal that he can understand about any thing, when he can stand up in his place, and ascribe the distresses of the country to an over production of food! He must be a pretty understanding and far-seeing man that could boast of having raised the price of the funds by the passing of the Power-of-Imprisonment Bill in 1817. His situation, indeed! He might just as well tell us of his *title* or his *star*. He really would seem to wish us to adopt in seriousness, the irony of POPE: "A Saint in *crape* is twice a Saint in *lawn*." If *situation* could make a man wise, this Prime Cock could beat Solomon hollow; for he has had situation of some sort or other for more than thirty years. Never was there people satisfied with a smaller portion of talent in its Prime Minister. Perhaps of the whole population of Kensington, there are not a hundred grown up men,

not as fit, to be Minister as he; only giving them just a few weeks by way of schooling. Of all the men that have had power, he, perhaps, is the very last, that ought to expect us to adopt an opinion upon his authority. We want something a great deal better than his authority to make us believe in the assertion which he makes here. Why does he not distinctly say that he can carry on war without a return to the paper-money? Every one knows that a war would require twenty or thirty millions a-year; every one knows that this cannot be raised in taxes. Every one knows these things; and does not every one know that it is impossible to obtain loans in gold? Every one knows this; and, therefore, it is sheer impudence to tell us that you can find means to carry on the war, leaving it to be understood, that you mean not to carry it on by an issue of assignats. The French know better: It has long been proved to their satisfaction, that you cannot carry on the war, without the issuing of assignats, and that they know that you are afraid to do.

But, *if you can go to war*, why did you not go to war now? You say, that you could do it, if the *interest or honour* of the country

demanded it. It is impossible to catch you at either of these nooses, for you will never allow any thing to be worthy of the name of interest or honour; that is to say, any thing that the French want to take from you. Here you are at a General Congress. The French ask you what you will do in the case of their going to war with Spain. You express, in a timid round-about sort of a way, your dissent as to an interference with Spain. The French proceed at once to interfere. You offer your mediation to France: and she rejects your mediation. You over and over again express the King's desire to preserve peace; and the French, without the smallest ceremony; without any attempt to sooth the feelings of the King resolve on war. And, the very first that they hear of the determination of the French, they hear through the speech of the King of France, who says positively, that he is about to march a hundred thousand men into Spain, to put down the present Government, and to enable Ferdinand to make such a Government as he pleases. If it is not to dishonour England to treat her in this sort of way, what is there that can dishonour her? Then, as to the interest. Can it be agreeable to the interest

of England for the Bourbons to have complete possession of Spain, the command of her fleets, and of all her resources? Every one must see, that this is against the interest of England. So that, here prevention is demanded, both by honour and by interest; and yet it does not take place. It cannot take place without war; and war is what we dare not venture upon.

The Prime Minister says, however, that, while he was ready to declare that he could find the means of carrying on a war, he must also say, that every rational man must feel, that a *continuance of peace was most desirable*. And why, good Sir? Why, good stern-path-of-duty man? You have plenty of means for the carrying on of war; but every rational man must feel that a continuance of peace is most desirable. Now, why? The why is this, or; rather these; first, we have had a long war; second, the country has endured a great deal; third, our commerce and manufactures enjoy a degree of prosperity that they had never before attained to; fourth, that we ought to keep these good things to ourselves, and not *throw them into the hands of other countries*! All these reasons are very good for keeping at

peace now ; but they would be just as good for keeping at peace, if the French were to take Guernsey and Jersey, (which it is likely they will in a short time) or even, if they were to take possession of the Isle of Wight. This is a mere question of counting-houses and custom-houses ; but, this Prime Minister knows very well, that these reasons have not weighed as one single straw. They are a mere excuse ; they serve very well to satisfy merchants and manufacturers, and fundholders ; and, indeed, as soon as these latter perceived, that there could be no war without assignats, they were decidedly for peace. This prime gentleman knows very well, that it is the peace, and that it was not the war, that saw the sufferings. He knows very well the fallacy of all this statement ; but it was his business to make out a justification for remaining at peace, under such a load of indignity.

Other reasons, however, he gave, for not going to war. If we went to war, he said, it must be a war of great expenditure of blood and money. There must be fleets, and armies as well as fleets. It could not be a war of ammunition, arms, provisions, or money : it must be a war of blood as well as

of treasure ; a war attended with losses extraordinary, and risks incalculable and unavoidable. This is a terrible picture. These Frenchmen are become terrible fellows, all of a sudden. It is only about seven years ago, that the Great Captain *conquered* them ; that he laid them under tribute ; that, in short, he subdued them. It is not more than about seven years since the *blood of MARSHAL NEY* stained the pavement ; and since the whiskered BLEUCHER and his worthy coadjutors, stripped the Galleries at Paris of the pictures and statues, the trophies of the valour of Frenchmen. It is only a little more than seven years since the Waterloo Column was voted by the Collective Wisdom of the nation ; and that column, too, was to be built upon a spot where Frenchmen might see it as they came from Dover to London. The column is not raised yet ; and those conquered Frenchmen are actually in Spain, in spite of the prayers of Gatton and Old Sarum ! Not only are they in Spain, these poor conquered devils, but, our Prime Minister tells us, that it would be a war of most terrible losses and risks, if we were to undertake to fight these same conquered Frenchmen in Spain !

However, the Prime Minister

while he is giving reasons for our not going to war, endeavours to hearten us up by telling us that the French will not succeed. We might then ask him, what becomes of all his *dreadful losses and risks*? These are his words: "He wondered that any man could doubt that the first operations of France would be successful." But, here is in this place, a piece of logic, sufficient of itself to immortalize any man not already immortalized as our inexpressible Prime Minister is. Long be the day before he quit us; for, whenever he go, we shall never see his like again. This piece of logic I pronounce to be matchless. It assumes what it pleases, to be sure. His object is to show, that to enter into the war, must, on our part, be wrong, whether the French were right or wrong, and whether there were a majority of Spaniards for or against her: "It might be better to prevent an evil than to oppose it when at maturity; but with regard to the present case, his (Earl Liverpool's) belief was, that the object of France was impracticable, except in one case, namely, that she was supported by a majority of the Spanish nation. If she were supported by a majority of that nation, would it be politic for

England to enter into a war for the support of the *minority against the majority* of the Spanish nation? He wondered that any man could doubt that the first operations of France would be successful; but although they might not meet with difficulties in the beginning, did it follow that the termination of their career would be equally fortunate? He did not say, that the termination would be unfortunate; but if Spain were to exert herself again, he saw no chance of ultimate success by the French. This being the case, he would ask would it be prudential on the part of Great Britain to enter into a war?"

There! Let Mr. Bellows-mender in Foot's farce beat that if he can. But observe, here the Spaniards; if there be a majority of them against the French, are able to beat the French without any assistance at all; though the noble Knight of the Garter had just before told us what a dreadful war, what rivers of blood and what heaps of treasure we must expend; what terrible losses and terrible risks we must encounter, if we had any thing to do with the war. This is so plain; so very glaring: it shows so clearly how hard the Prime Cock was

pushed for reasons, that it is unnecessary to observe further upon it.

And now we come to a reason of another sort. The Prime Minister tells us, that at present the war was not popular in France, amongst the commercial men; and he believed it was not popular amongst the army; but, said he, (oh, the cunning man!) if we take part with Spain, the Spanish war will, from one end of France to the other, become an *English war*, and become popular amongst all ranks of the people! Hard indeed must a man be pushed, when he can resort to a subterfuge like this. According to this, England must never meddle in any war again in which France has any thing to do. The opinion is foolish indeed: excessively foolish; for the French people all know, that to attack Spain is to attack England. They have been very duly informed that England has been extremely anxious to prevent their marching into Spain, so that they already regard it as an English war; but, leaving this out of the question, what a pretty state we are reduced to if, amongst our reasons for not defending a friend, we state a belief that the French people would attack him more furiously on account of our

defence. What would you think of a friend, who, when you called upon him for assistance against a powerful enemy, were to say, You had better not have me to assist you, for your enemy hates me more than he hates you; and he will give you a more severe beating for my sake. You would answer, Oh, no: join me, and we will beat him! It is in vain, however, to reason with such a desperate lover of peace.

The Prime Minister, unwilling to leave his measures undefended, turns at last upon the poor Spaniards themselves, and says of them as bad as the French have ever said. He says, that *Spain is a divided country*; a country torn by a war carried on by country against town, by the peasants against the crown, by priests against the lawyers and the commercial body; a war of the fanaticism of religion against the fanaticism of liberty; and the question now was, whether this country ought to engage in a war, to support one party in Spain against the other party. What have the French themselves said against the Spaniards more than this? If this be true, upon what is it that the march of the French into Spain has been opposed? But it is not true. There is a government

in Spain. There is a government with whom we have been negotiating; at which we have had a resident Minister; a government, having a constitution which we ourselves had acknowledged; a government with whom *we have treaties*; and yet our Prime Minister represents Spain as being in a state so divided, so disjointed, so confused, as for it to be impossible for us to know who or what we were fighting for, if we were to embark in the cause of Spain.

Such, pretty Gentlemen of Whitehall, is the state of the case, and such has been your conduct with regard to that case. Every thing shows your anxious desire to prevent the French from marching into Spain; or shows you to have been hypocrites of the vilest of all vile descriptions. The Courier and the New Times openly express their wishes for the success of the French. These papers would not do this if they had not good reason for what they were doing. I can easily conceive it possible that there should exist that which I need not describe; and that the Dictionary at Paris gives a translation very different from the original both as to *Papers* and *Speeches*. However, be this as it may, the nation is just where it ought to

be, having men like you to manage its affairs. Never will you be called to account by the "*Gentlemen opposite*;" I mean the *regular* gentlemen, who have just the same interest that you have. Nevertheless, this march of the Bourbons is an unpleasant circumstance for you. One of two things it must produce: another revolution in France, or the complete domination of the Bourbons in Spain. The latter, which is the most probable, is the least to be dreaded by you; but it has its terrors. The mortification that it will excite will be very great; and the effect of it must be to throw discredit and odium upon the System that has produced it; which system will keep steadily on crushing landlords and farmers to the earth; beggaring every body but the tax-eaters and tithe-eaters; so that disgrace will not have pecuniary prosperity to balance against it.

As to the result of this war, it is a matter of less consequence than the beginning of it. What we have to hope for is, that it may tend to render the present domestic System of England what it ought to be in the eyes of the people at large. But, perhaps, the probability is, that it will have no very striking effect; that the country will go on

sinking by degrees, citing in justification of an act of baseness to-day, an act of baseness committed by it last week; and so on till it become that low and despicable thing which the French writers have long been predicting it would become. It has been a great bubble altogether for the last forty years. All has been showy, and all has been false. As long as it could work away with paper-money, it had influence and power to any extent that it pleased. It could bring millions of men into the field; or make them instantly lay down their arms. Deprived of its paper-money; reduced to the employment of none but solid means, it cannot put in motion, or cause to halt, a single battalion. How it must make shallow persons stare, to see the treatment of the Great Captain at Verona! No more attention paid to his papers than if they had been ballads from Grub Street, or plays of Lord John Russell. It was not thus, when we had to talk of millions of English money! The moment the Congress opened, I said—The French will do just what they please: they have the good wishes of the Holy Allies, and we have no money. The System has reduced itself down to its natural level. It has run itself out. For

years I have said, let the necessity of war arise, and you will see the destructive tendency of this system. That necessity has arisen, and the prophecy is verified.

WM. COBBETT.

SPEECH OF
LORD VISCOUNT FOLKESTONE,
*On the Motion of LORD ALTHORP,
on the 16th Instant, in the
House of Commons, for a Re-
peal of the Foreign Enlistment
Bill.*

[The following Speech is so just in its sentiments, and calculated to be so useful, that I cannot refrain from inserting it.—The PAPERS relating to the Negotiations will follow this; that is to say, a part will. I do not like to fill up in this way; but I must have these Papers. The Register has, for more than twenty years past, contained all these things when of importance. This is a memorable affair; and I must not omit them. I shall get them into into about four Registers; so as not to let them take up too much room at a time.]

Lord Folkestone supported the motion; but he rose less for the purpose of attempting to add to the arguments of his Noble Friend on the particular measure before them, than to express the feelings which

had been excited in his breast by the speech of the Right Honourable Secretary of State two nights ago. He never rose in that House without pain that his language failed to express his feelings; but he now particularly experienced that pain at the want of fit language to express the shame, the shame and indignation he felt at the deep degradation of the country as depicted in the speech of the Right Honourable Secretary, and in the papers which he had presented to them. [Hear, hear!] The Right Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Canning) had told them that if they were to be neutral, they should adhere to a strict and rigid neutrality. He hoped the Right Honourable Gentleman would adhere to his own rule, yet he had thought himself justified in saying, with respect to Portugal, that though this country was bound to it by a defensive, it was not by an offensive alliance, and that, consequently, if Portugal embarked rashly in war, the treaty would be no longer binding on us. Why did the Right Hon. Gentleman go out of his way to make this declaration? Why was he so anxious to tell France that if she provoked Portugal into a war, she might still calculate that we would take no part in the contest? [Hear, hear!] The Right Hon. Gentleman brought forward passages as if to show more completely the degradation and infamy to which the country was reduced. The first passage was that relating to the Duke of Wellington, which shewed that the Ministers were, up to the commencement of the mission to Verona, ignorant of the intentions of France. What, had not the Ministers seen the *Cordon Sanitaire*? [Hear!] Why did we pay so many thousands a-year to an Ambassador to Paris, if it were not to get some information as to the designs of that intriguing Court? [Hear!] But what was the substance of all our representations to

the French Court?—"If you invade Spain, we will have nothing to do with it." We might as well say—"If you are determined to rob and murder a man on the highway, we will have nothing to do with it." [Hear, hear!] There were no remonstrances as to the ties of honour or morality, or of treaties, or of gratitude. This was a part of "the plain unvarnished tale" which the Right Hon. Gentleman had given notice of, and which was only plain and unvarnished, because there was nothing favourable to his own reputation. If there had been the spirit in the House which ought to distinguish it, it would not tolerate a man who could read that passage as a part of his defence. The other part of the documents which had been read by the Right Honourable Gentleman was, that in which he talked of his confidence in the repeated assurance of His Most Christian Majesty's Government, that he had no views of aggrandizement. [Hear!] If the Right Honourable Gentleman was sincere in this declaration, he must have been one of the readiest of dupes, for the French Government almost at the same time had been avowing that it had schemes of aggrandizement—not in State Papers, indeed, but in the speeches of the Ministers, of Chateaubriand himself, it was declared that the object was to pursue that noble course of policy which had been begun by Louis XIV., and the object of which was to obtain such a control over Spain as would give France a commanding position on the Continent of Europe. [Hear, hear!] M. Chateaubriand was too keen and cautious a politician to tell this to the Right Honourable Gentleman in his State Papers, at least in such part of them as the Right Honourable Gentleman had thought fit to publish. [Hear!] In the speech of the Duke of Fitzjames the sentiment was expressed with still more strength—"The English

Minister," he said, "objects to the invasion of Spain; well he may! but as a Frenchman I support and applaud it, as calculated to raise the honour and greatness of France." The Right Hon. Gentleman (Mr. Canning) was either duped himself, or not being duped, he was willing to dupe the House. [Hear, hear!] He was also satisfied, he professed, with the promise of the King of France, not to induce the King of Spain to do any thing derogatory to the independence of Spain! Did not the Right Hon. Gentleman know that the French Government had already called on the Spanish Government to do acts most derogatory to the independence of Spain. [Hear, hear] Had he not himself acknowledged, had not every Englishman acknowledged that the language of the King of France was directly inconsistent with the principles of the British Constitution, as well as of the independence of all States, and that it was such as no British Minister could counsel the Spaniards to submit to? [Hear, hear!] That language, those pretensions, formed the ground of the war; yet the Right Hon. Gentleman professed himself satisfied with the assurance that nothing would be done inconsistent with the independence of Spain. The papers were calculated to make every Englishman's blood boil in his veins [hear!] When he read them, the night they were presented to the House, they were dropped from his hands with indignation and horror [hear.] In one part the Spanish Minister asked for something more than a declaration of cold neutrality; that we should give some expression of our sense of the justice of the Spanish cause, and it was refused. The Right Hon. Gentleman chose rather to bend low down, to crouch, to truckle to the Bourbon Government of France. [Hear, hear] Simply for the sake of independence, which we professed to be pained to

see invaded, for the sake of liberty, of which Englishmen were once proud to be champions, the Spanish Minister had implored some written testimony, but it was refused. Was not this enough to make a man ashamed of his being an Englishman, when a man who was willing so to degrade his country should be allowed to continue its Minister and its Representative?—(Hear, hear!) It appeared, too, that the Duke of Wellington said to France and the other Allies, "We have told you all that has passed between us and the Court of Madrid;" and yet having made this full disclosure, and being an independent State, or, rather, professing it, for he believed we were not, our Representative was not ashamed to say, "We know nothing of your transactions with Spain since 1820, and therefore we can give no opinion on your conduct." Was it not a simple thing to ask what those transactions were?—The information was within our reach, the subject of discussion was such that it was necessary we should get it, yet we dared not ask what had been done. He would not go into further remarks on the Papers, but he could not refrain from making these observations on proceedings in which the country had been so dishonoured and debased. It was certainly a very different question whether we should now go to war. Lord Chatham had said at one time that he should be glad to see the Power that would fire a cannon in Europe without letting him know the reason. We were somewhat changed since that time; we had spent some money in what we had called the liberation of Europe; we had boasted of being the conquerors of France, and the Prime Minister still wore the Order of the Garter which had been conferred on him by a special statute of the Order, because, under his administration, this country had been raised to an unexampled height of greatness and glory. He

still was a British Minister, he still bore the star on his breast; he was as well responsible for misfortunes as he took credit for prosperity, and he in the other House, and his colleague in this, brought in Papers to shew that the honour of the country was surrendered, and that we were afraid to defend what we were fourteen years ago defending—what had been called the outwork of England, and for the sake of which we had perhaps contracted great part of the debt which weighed us down to the earth, crouching at the feet of the Bourbon Government. Why were we not now at war in behalf of the liberty of the world, and of the independence of Spain, whose separation from France was essential to the liberty of England? Who, indeed, could doubt it that looked at the map? When we heard the last night such woeful intelligence as to Ireland, did we recollect the position of Spain in relation to the ports of that country? Yet, the whole security of the Right Honourable Secretary was his confidence in the assurance of the Bourbon Government, by whom he had been duped so egregiously. (Hear, hear.) His conviction, however, was, that if we did not get rid of the debt, we should give the Bourbons the dominion over the West of Europe. And besides its effect on our domestic concerns, that burden would force us to abandon the rank we held in Europe. We had heard of the sympathy of the English nation for the Spanish people. They had heard of a recent entertainment given to the Spanish Minister as a sign of this sympathy. He did not charge His Majesty's Ministers with any participation in this exhibition. They had nothing to do with it, nor had he; and, he would ask, of what use was this sympathy without assistance? He would say, in the language of scripture—"If a brother or sister be naked, and des-

titute of daily food, and one of you say unto them, depart in peace—be you warmed and filled: notwithstanding, ye give them not those things which are needful to the body, what doth it profit?"—The Right Honourable Gentleman opposite had prayed for abstinence from all inquiry (Mr. Canning expressed dissent); at all events, he had thanked the House for their abstinence from inquiry, and had deluded Parliament into a belief that there was a probability of our going to war in defence of Spain against the aggression of France. Under that delusion the House of Commons had voted large establishments, and in one instance an increased establishment, which they would not have granted had they been assured by Ministers that war would not take place. And the House might have been so assured; for it was evident from the papers on the Table that His Majesty's Ministers had determined from the very outset not to go to war. Ever since the peace in 1815, the House had been told again and again by the Noble Lord who preceded the Right Hon. Gent. in the Foreign Department, that it was necessary to keep up a large military establishment, because the other powers of Europe kept up large armies, and that we might be enabled to take a commanding attitude in the politics of the Continent. Was our present degraded position all that the country was to obtain in compensation for the burdens which it had so long endured? The Right Honourable Gentleman had been egregiously duped by the French negotiators, and was now endeavouring to play off their politics upon the House. He felt it his duty to warn the House and the country of the state of degradation to which we were about to sink by the course of policy pursued by His Majesty's Ministers. The people of England detested and abhorred that base and cowardly

system of policy by which their hands were tied up from interfering in behalf of the rights and liberties of Spain. His Honourable and Learned Friend (Mr. Brougham) had in a brilliant speech the other night given the House some foretaste of the blessings which the commercial part of the country were likely to reap from a system of strict neutrality. He (Lord Folkestone) trusted that the Gentlemen connected with the commercial interests, some of whom had signalized their zeal for the Spanish cause at the London Tavern, though they had objected to show their sympathy in any other way [a laugh], would at least awake to a sense of their own interest, and feel the necessity of showing some sympathy with the people of England, though they had shown none for the people of Spain. If the Government refused to take up arms in behalf of Spain on the present occasion, he should be glad to know what degree of insult or injury would induce them to depart from their passive and dishonourable acquiescence in the dictates of France? It was our debt, the cursed debt, which weighed us down, and had reduced us to our present state of degradation; it was the debt which had prevented the Government from embarking in this contest, and, until that debt were got rid of, England would never resume the station to which she was entitled among the nations of Europe.

BOURBON WAR.

*Papers laid before Parliament,
April 14, 1823.*

CLASS A.—VERONA and PARIS.

No. I.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received September 24.

(Extract.) Paris, Sept. 21, 1822.
I had a long discussion with Mon-

seigneur de Villele yesterday, on the relations of this Government with Spain.

It appears, that for a considerable time past, I believe since the alarm of infectious fever in Spain, the French Government have been collecting troops in the southern departments of France. They have not, however, on the immediate frontier, a larger body of men than are sufficient for the performance of the duties of the "Cordon Sanitaire," so long as that precaution is necessary, in consequence of the prevalence of the fever in the neighbouring provinces of Spain; or than can fairly be deemed necessary for the purposes of observation of a country which is the seat of a civil war, and for the protection of the French frontier from insult, by the different parties in operation immediately on the borders.

M. de Villele said, that the assembly of the Congress at the present moment was not a matter of indifference in relation to the situation of affairs in Spain, or to that in which the two countries stood towards each other. There was no doubt that expectations were formed respecting the result of the deliberations of the Congress on the affairs of Spain, as well in Spain as elsewhere; and that if the Congress were to separate, and to come to no decision on those affairs, it was probable that the existing evils would be greatly aggravated, and that the two countries might be forced into a war.

Monsieur de Villele wished that the Congress should take into consideration the actual position of the French Government in relation to Spain, and the hypothesis under which they might be forced into a war; and that the four other Powers of the Alliance should declare what line they would each take, in case of the occurrence of any of the events which they conceived would force them to war. I told Monsieur de Villele that it would be quite

impossible for us to declare beforehand what would be our conduct upon any hypothetical case.

I should wish to receive His Majesty's instructions what line I shall take, and what arguments I shall use, in case the French Government should make the proposition at the Congress which M. de Villèle has made to me, respecting a declaration by the Allies.

No. II.—Mr. Secretary Canning to the Duke of Wellington.

Foreign Office, Sept. 27, 1822.

(Extract.)

If there be a determined project to interfere by force or by menace in the present struggle in Spain, so convinced are His Majesty's Government of the uselessness and danger of any such interference—so objectionable does it appear to them in principle, as well as utterly impracticable in execution, that when the necessity arises, or (I would rather say) when the opportunity offers, I am to instruct your Grace at once frankly and peremptorily to declare, that to any *such interference*, come what may, His Majesty *will not be a party*.

No. III.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received October 31.

(Extract.) Verona, Oct. 22, 1822.

We had a conference on Sunday night, at which the French Minister, M. de Montmorency read a paper, of which I inclose a copy.

I imagine that each of the Ministers will answer this paper. In my answer I shall review our line of conduct since April 1820; and shall *decline to engage ourselves to adopt any measure beforehand*, or till we shall have a full knowledge of all the circumstances which have occurred between the two countries. I propose, besides, to point out, that, considering the relative position of France and Spain, it is not probable that Spain will declare against them; if they explain, as

they ought, the meaning and object of *their Corps of Observation* and make some allowance for the state of effervescence of men's minds in Spain in a state of revolution and civil war.

(Translation of Inclosure in No. 3.)

Questions addressed by the French Plenipotentiary to the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Prussia, Russia, and Great Britain.

Verona, Oct. 20, 1822.

1. In case France should find herself under the necessity of recalling her Minister from Madrid, and of breaking off all diplomatic relations with Spain, will the High Courts be disposed to adopt the like measures, and to recal their respective Missions?

2. Should war break out between France and Spain, under what form and by what acts would the High Powers afford to France, that moral support which would give to her measures the weight and authority of the Alliance, and inspire into a salutary dread the Revolutionists of all countries?

3. What, in short, is the intention of the High Powers as to the extent and the form of the *effective assistance* (*secours matériel*) which they would be disposed to give to France, in case active interference should, on her demand, become necessary.

No. IV.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received November 14.

(Extract.) Verona, Nov. 5, 1822.

Prince Metternich called together a conference of the five Cabinet Ministers on Wednesday evening, at which were delivered in answers to the demands of the French Minister of the 20th ult. from the Russian, Austrian, and Prussian Ministers; and that from myself, a copy of which I inclose.

(Inclosure in No. 4.)

MEMORANDUM.

Answer of the Duke of Wellington

to the Questions of the French Plenipotentiary.

Verona, Oct. 30, 1822.

Since the month of April 1820, the British Government have availed themselves of every opportunity of recommending to His Majesty's Allies to abstain from all interference in the internal affairs of Spain.

Without adverting to those principles which His Majesty's Government must always consider the rule of their conduct, in relation to the internal affairs of other Countries, they considered that to whatever degree either the origin of the Spanish Revolution, the System then established, or the conduct of those who have since had the management of the internal affairs of Spain might be disapproved of, any amelioration which might be desired in the Spanish System, for the sake of Spain herself, ought to be sought for in measures to be adopted in Spain, rather than abroad; and particularly in the confidence which the people should be taught to feel in the character and measures of the King.

They considered that an interference with a view to assist the Monarch on the Throne, to overturn that which had been settled, and which he had guaranteed, or to promote the establishment of any other form of Government or Constitution, particularly by force, would only place that Monarch in a false position, and prevent him from looking to the internal means of amelioration which might be within his reach.

Such an interference always appeared to the British Government an unnecessary assumption of responsibility; which, considering all the circumstances, must expose the King of Spain to danger, and the Power or Powers which should interfere, to obloquy, certain risks, and possible disasters; to enormous expenses, and final disap-

pointment in producing any result.

Upon these principles His Majesty has advised his Allies, and has acted himself, from the month of April 1820, to the present day.

The Protocols and other Acts of the Congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, which established the union at present existing between the Five Powers, so happily for the world, require the most *unlimited confidence* and communication on the part of each; and accordingly His Majesty has never failed to communicate to his Allies, and *particularly to France, every instruction which he has sent to his Minister at Madrid*; and all the communications made by His Majesty's commands to the *Minister of Spain residing in London*:—all in the same spirit of good will towards the King of Spain and the Spanish nation.

It is impossible to look at the existing relations between France and Spain, adverting to what has passed from the commencement of the year 1820 to the present moment, without being sensible of the unfortunately false position in which the King of Spain is placed; and that the spirit of party in both countries, having aggravated the national antipathy which antecedent circumstances had occasioned, is in a great measure the cause of the unfortunate irritation in Spain against France, to which his Excellency the Minister of France has adverted. The great object of His Majesty's foreign policy is to preserve peace among nations: he feels the most anxious interest for the happiness of His Catholic Majesty and the honour of his Government; and it would be his sincere desire to allay that irritation.

But the British Government cannot but feel, that to make any declaration on any of the three points referred to by his Excellency, without a previous accurate knowledge of all the circumstances which have occurred between the two countries, would be not only pre-

mature and unjust, but would probably be unavailing; and would in fact deprive His Majesty of the power of discussing and deciding upon the measures of his own Government in this affair hereafter, when he should be better informed. His Majesty must either place himself in this painful position, or he must do what would be equally painful to his feelings, require from his august Friend and Ally the King of France, that he should submit his conduct to the advice and control of His Majesty.

His Majesty's Government cannot think either alternative to be necessary; but are of opinion, that a review of the obvious circumstances of the situation of France, as well as Spain, will shew, that whatever may be the tone assumed towards France by the ruling Powers in Spain, they are not in a state to carry into execution any plan of real hostility.

Considering that *a civil war exists in the whole extent of the frontier which separates the two kingdoms; that hostile Armies are in movement and in operation in every part of it; and that there is not a town or village on the French frontier which is not liable to insult and injury—there is no person who must not approve of the precaution which His Most Christian Majesty has taken in forming a Corps of Observation for the protection of his frontier, and for the preservation of the tranquillity of his people.*

His Britannic Majesty sincerely wishes that this measure may be effectual in attaining the objects for which it is calculated; and that the wisdom of the French Government will have induced them to explain it at Madrid, in such terms as will satisfy the Government of His Catholic Majesty of its necessity.

Such an explanation will, it is hoped, tend to allay in some degree the irritation against France; and, on the other hand, it may be hoped

that some allowance will be made in France for the state of effervescence of men's minds in Spain, in the very crisis of a revolution and civil war.

A moment's reflection upon the relative power of the two States will shew, that the real evil to which His Most Christian Majesty is exposed, is that resulting from the operations of the civil war on the neighbouring frontier of Spain; against which the measure which his Government have adopted is *best calculated to preserve him.*

Even *revolutionary madness* could not calculate upon the success of a serious attack by Spain upon France, under any circumstances which it is possible to suppose to exist at present in the latter kingdom. But the attention of the Spanish Government is now occupied by a civil war, the operations of which *certainly justify the formation of a Corps of Observation in France; and it is not very probable that they would, at this moment, desire to break with France.*

Neither is it to be believed that, in their present situation, they would not desire still to enjoy the advantage of that countenance to their system, which the presence of the French Ambassador at the seat of Government must afford them.

His Majesty therefore considers any rupture by Spain, or any measure on her part which may render necessary the immediate discontinuance of diplomatic relations by France, very improbable: and as His Majesty is quite unacquainted with what has passed between France and Spain since the Month of April 1820; and his Government cannot know upon what grounds His Most Christian Majesty's Government may think proper to discontinue the diplomatic relations of France with Spain: *or upon what grounds war may break out between the two countries; it is impossible for them now to pronounce what advice they should consider it their duty*

to give to His Majesty, in case either or both of those events should occur.

His Majesty *most anxiously wishes* that such *extremities may be avoided*; and he feels *convinced* that the Government of His Most Christian Majesty will *find means of avoiding them*.

No. V.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received Nov. 21.

(Extract.) Verona, Nov. 12, 1822.

I have little to report as having occurred on the Spanish question, since I wrote to you on the 5th inst.

But I inclose to you a memorandum on what is passing here, which I send to Sir Charles Stuart *by this occasion*.

(Inclosure in No. 5.)

MEMORANDUM.

Verona, Nov. 12, 1822.

On the 20th of October, the French Minister gave in a paper, requiring from the Ministers of the Allies to know, whether, if France should be under the necessity of withdrawing her Minister from Spain, the other Allied Powers would do the same?—In case France should be involved in war with Spain, what countenance the Allies would give the former? And, in case France should require it, what assistance?

To these questions the Three Continental Allies answered on the 30th of October, That they would act as *France should* in respect to their Ministers in Spain, and would give to France *every countenance and assistance she should require*; the cause for such assistance, and the period and the mode of giving it being reserved to be specified in a treaty.

The Minister of Great Britain answered, that having no *knowledge of the cause of dispute*, and not being able to form a judgment upon an *hypothetical case*, he could give no answer to any of the questions.

The mode of communicating with

Spain was considered on the 31st with a view to prevent a rupture between France and Spain. It was agreed that the Minister of each of the Four Continental Courts at Madrid should present a separate Note of the same tenour, and drawn up on the same principles; and on the 1st of November it was settled, that the Four Courts should draw up their Notes and communicate them to the British Minister; who should, upon seeing these Notes, make known the line which his Court would take.

Since that meeting, it is understood that the plan of proceeding proposed and agreed to has been altered. Instead of Official Notes to be presented by the several Ministers at Madrid to the Spanish Government, it is now intended that despatches shall be written to those Ministers respectively, in which the several Courts will express their wishes and intentions: this mode of proceeding is adopted, as affording greater latitude for discussion and explanation than that by Official Notes.

Accordingly, Monsieur de Montmorency has prepared the draft of his despatch; and it is understood that the Ministers of the Continental Powers are preparing theirs.

These are the facts which have occurred at the existing Congress.

In the course of the discussions which have taken place upon this occasion, a *marked difference* of opinion as to the mode of action has appeared between the Continental Courts on the one hand, and England on the other.

The Minister of the latter Power has recommended that France, and the Powers which should interfere in this case, should confine themselves to what may properly be called the external quarrel between France and Spain; should not menace; and above all, should not approach Spain in the form of enemies, bound in a Treaty of defensive Alliance against her.

No. VI.—The Duke of Wellington to Mr. Secretary Canning.—Received Dec. 6.

(Extract.) Verona, Nov. 22, 1822.

I inclose the minute of the answer which I returned to the Ministers of the Allies on the 20th inst. when they communicated to me the despatches which they proposed to write to the Ministers of their several Courts at Madrid.

MINUTE.

(Inclosure in No. 6.)

Verona, Nov. 20. 1822.

When the Ministers of the Five Courts last assembled on the 1st instant, the object of their common solicitude was, to allay the irritation existing in Spain against France, and to prevent a possible rupture between the two Powers.

Although His Majesty's Government did not consider themselves sufficiently informed, either of what had already taken place between France and Spain, or of what might occasion a rupture, to be able to answer in the affirmative, the questions submitted to the Conference by his Excellency the Minister of France; yet, knowing the anxiety of the King, my Master, for the honour of His Most Christian Majesty, and for the preservation of the peace of the world, I was willing to enter into the consideration of the measures proposed, with a view to attain our common object.

It was settled, that the Notes to be prepared according to the proposition of His Highness the Austrian Minister, and to be presented to the Spanish Government on this occasion, should be communicated to me, in order that I might see, whether, consistently with the view which the King had invariably taken of the affairs of Spain, and with the principles which had governed His Majesty's conduct in relation to the internal concerns of other countries, His Majesty's Government could take any part which might forward

the common purpose of preserving the general tranquillity.

The Ministers of the Allied Courts have thought proper to make known to Spain the sentiments of their respective Sovereigns, by despatches addressed to the Ministers of their several Courts, residing at Madrid, instead of by Official Notes—as a mode of communication less formal, and affording greater facility of discussion.

These despatches, it appears, are to be communicated *in extenso* to the Spanish Government.

The origin, circumstances, and consequences of the Spanish Revolution, the existing state of affairs in Spain, and the conduct of those who have been at the head of the Spanish Government, may have endangered the safety of other countries, and may have excited the uneasiness of the Governments whose Ministers I am now addressing; and those Governments may think it necessary to address the Spanish Government upon the topics referred to in these despatches.

These sentiments and opinions have certainly been entertained by the three Cabinets of Austria, Prussia, and Russia, for a considerable period of time; and the British Government duly appreciates the *forbearance and deference* for the opinions of other Cabinets, which have dictated the delay to make these communications, to the present moment. But having been delayed till now, I would request those Ministers to consider, whether this is the moment at which such remonstrances ought to be made—whether they are calculated to allay the irritation against France, and to prevent a possible rupture—and whether they might not with advantage be delayed to a later period.

They are certainly calculated to irritate the Government of Spain—to afford ground for a belief that advantage has been taken of the irritation existing between that Government and France, to call down

upon Spain the power of the Alliance; and thus to embarrass still more the difficult position of the French Government.

The result of these communications will probably be, that the diplomatic relations between the Three Allied Courts and Spain will be discontinued, whatever may be the state of the questions between France and Spain: this occurrence cannot assist the cause of France; as those questions will stand upon their own ground, and the Government of France must decide them upon their own merits.

But these communications are not only calculated to embarrass the French Government, but likewise that of the King, my Master. His Majesty feels sincerely for the King and the people of Spain; he is anxious to see a termination of the evils and misfortunes by which that country is afflicted, and that it should be prosperous and happy. His Majesty likewise earnestly desires that the usual relations of amity and good neighbourhood may be re-established between France and Spain; and His Majesty's Government would have been anxious to co-operate with those of his Allies in allaying the existing irritation, and in preventing a possible rupture.

But His Majesty's Government are of opinion, that to animadvert upon the internal transactions of an independent State, unless such transactions affect the essential interests of His Majesty's subjects, is inconsistent with those principles on which His Majesty has invariably acted on all questions relating to the internal concerns of other countries; that such animadversions, if made, must involve His Majesty in serious responsibility, if they should produce any effect, and must irritate if they should not, and, if addressed, as proposed, to the Spanish Government, are likely to be injurious to the best interests of Spain, and to produce the worst consequences upon the probable

discussions between that country and France.

The King's Government must, therefore, decline to advise His Majesty to hold a common language with his Allies upon this occasion; and it is so necessary for His Majesty not to be supposed to participate in a measure of this description, and calculated to produce such consequences, that his Government must equally refrain from advising His Majesty to direct, that any communication should be made to the Spanish Government on the subject of its relations with France.

His Majesty, therefore, must limit his exertions and good offices to the endeavours of his Minister at Madrid to allay the ferment which these communications must occasion, and to do all the good in his power.

No. VII.—Mr. Secretary Canning to the Duke of Wellington.

Foreign Office, Dec. 6, 1822.

(Extract.)

The latest date of your Grace's despatches from Verona is the 19th ultimo.

The French Mail due yesterday has, from some unaccountable accident, failed to arrive; and we are left in an uncertainty as to every thing that has passed at Verona for more than a fortnight. In this state of things, however difficult it may be to shape instructions to a case not ascertained, it has nevertheless been felt by His Majesty's advisers, that we should be wanting to our duty if we did not submit to His Majesty the course which it would be expedient to pursue in that which is understood to be the present situation of the question of Peace or War between France and Spain.

M. de Villele has taken several opportunities of expressing to Sir Charles Stuart his own earnest desire for the preservation of peace; and his wish to receive, not only the support, but the advice of the

British Government in his endeavours to preserve it.

I have the King's commands to signify to your Grace His Majesty's pleasure, that your Grace should seek a conversation with M. de Villele; and, after referring to His Excellency's communications through Sir Charles Stuart, should offer to that Minister the mediation of His Majesty between their Most Christian and Catholic Majesties.

It will not escape your Grace's observation, that in order to afford a prospect of success in our mediation, if France should be willing to employ it, there should be some reasonable hope of a similar acceptance on the part of Spain.

I inclose to your Grace an extract of a Despatch from the Spanish Government to its Chargé d'Affaires in London, which was read and delivered to me by M. de Colomb in a conference the day before yesterday.

The remaining part of the Despatch to M. de Colomb (with which I do not trouble your Grace on this occasion) relates to the questions pending between the two Governments respecting commercial grievances, and the piracies in the West Indian Seas.

(To be continued.)

FOREST SEEDS.

- No. 14. White Oak Acorns.
- 15. Red Oak ditto.
- 16. Black Oak ditto.
- 17. Black Walnuts.
- 18. Hickory Nuts.
- 19. Chesnuts.
- 20. Gum-Tree.
- 21. Cedar.
- 22. Paper Birch.
- 23. Persimon.
- 24. Catalpa.
- 25. Althea Frutex.

The sorts from No. 14 to 19

inclusive must be put into cool sand or earth directly. Then, as soon as may be, sown in beds, 3 feet wide, and in drills, *across the beds*, the drills at 8 inches distance from each other, and *three inches and a half deep*, and the Acorns and Nuts at 3 inches from each other in the drill. The ground to be *fresh dug*, and the earth pressed well down upon the Acorns and Nuts.—Nos. 20, 21 and 22, to be sown in beds and drills, same width and distance as before, but the drills to be only a *couple of inches deep*. Sown *thin*. The Birch and Cedar are so very small that they cannot very well be sown thin. The ground to be made *very fine*, and pressed well down upon the seed.—No. 23 in drills and beds as before, the drills 3 inches deep, the seed 3 inches apart in the drill.—No. 24. You must *open the pods*, take out the seed, and put them along drills $2\frac{1}{2}$ inches deep, and about three inches apart in the drill.—No. 25. Put the seeds along the drills $2\frac{1}{2}$ deep and about 3 in. apart in the drills.—All the seeds from No. 20, inclusive, except No. 23, are *dry seeds*, and can be kept like any other dry seeds. This is a most useful and most beautiful assemblage of trees. No. 23 and 24 are tall *shrubs*, and 25 is a *shrub*.—The seed is all good; and, if the ground be good and *fresh dug*, and the seeds all *sown well*, they will come up.—See my *Gardening Book*, Paragraphs from 155 to 168.—Sow according to the directions there given, and your seed will grow, I warrant it.—The Persimon must be kept like the Acorns.—The Cedar Pods must be laid in the sun to *open*.—Each Pod contains many Seeds.

MARKETS.

Average Prices of CORN throughout ENGLAND, for the week ending 5th April.

Per Quarter.

	s.	d.
Wheat	50	9
Rye	26	9
Barley	32	7
Oats	21	11
Beans	30	1
Peas	34	0

Corn Exchange, Mark Lane.

Quantities and Prices of British Corn, &c. sold and delivered in this Market, during the week ended Saturday, 5th April.

Qrs.	£.	s.	d.	Average,	s.	d.
Wheat... 5,107 for 13,391	10	8	52	5		
Barley... 3,132....	5,200	5	11	33	2	
Oats... 10,359....	12,482	2	3	24	1	
Rye... 66....	69	4	0	24	8	
Beans... 1,672....	2,388	9	5	28	6	
Peas... 570....	989	12	1	34	8	

SMITHFIELD, Monday, April 14th.

Per Stone of 8 pounds (alive).

	s.	d.	s.	d.
Beef	3	4	to	4 4
Mutton.....	4	2	—	5 0
Veal	3	6	—	5 6
Pork	3	8	—	4 6
Lamb	5	6	—	6 4

Beasts ... 2,503 | Sheep ... 16,120
Calves 170 | Pigs 240

NEWGATE (same day).

Per Stone of 8 pounds (dead).

	s.	d.	s.	d.
Beef	2	6	to	3 6
Mutton.....	3	0	—	3 10
Veal	2	8	—	4 4
Pork	2	8	—	4 8
Lamb	4	0	—	6 0

LEADENHALL (same day).

Per Stone of 8 pounds (dead).

	s.	d.	s.	d.
Beef	2	4	to	3 8
Mutton.....	3	0	—	4 0
Veal	3	8	—	4 8
Pork	3	0	—	4 8
Lamb	5	0	—	6 0

City, 16 April, 1823.

BACON.

The speculators have made great efforts during the past week; and, as we predicted, their efforts have been successful: there has been an advance of full 20 per cent. since our last; and the general opinion now is, that it has not reached the highest point. This advance is much against the interest of the manufacturers who had engaged to ship considerable quantities at the late prices; and, indeed, against the interest of *all*, except those speculators who are adroit enough to take advantage of the present rage for buying, to realize a profit. A great deal of what has been done lately, has arisen from jealousy on the part of some parties who have been accustomed, heretofore, to act a prominent part; and who, having had no hand in the early and *profitable* operations, have come in at the close, thereby supporting the engagements of their rivals. The truth is, there is not *natural* business for one half of those engaged; so that the interests of the great body of the trade are continually liable to all the consequences of those fluctuations which wild speculation invariably occasions. Bacon bought at the present market price cannot be *dried* and sold to the *retailers* without a loss. On board 42s.—Landed 44s.

BUTTER.

The continuance of weather favourable for the consumption of *salt* Butter, has kept up a great demand for every thing good; but for

inferiors there is little demand.—
Carlow, 86s. to 88s.—Belfast, 82s.
to 84s.—Waterford or Dublin, 74s.
to 76s.—Dutch, 88s. to 92s.

CHEESE.

There has been a general advance
in the prices of Cheese, both here
and in the country; but the ad-
vance here has not kept pace with
the expectations of the factors;
for Cheese cannot be sold here to
safe people, at a profit upon the
prices which they have been giving
in the country. Fine Old Cheshire,
70s. to 72s.—New, 56s. to 64s.—
Fine Somerset, 68s. to 74s.—Double
Gloucester, 62s. to 64s.—Single,
56s. to 62s.—Round Dutch, 42s.
to 44s.

POTATOES.

SPITALFIELDS.—per Ton.

Ware.....	£ 4	0	to	£ 0	0
Middlings.....	2	10	—	0	0
Chats.....	0	0	—	0	0
Common Red..	0	0	—	0	0
Onions..	0s.	0d.	—	0s.	0d.

BOROUGH.—per Ton.

Ware.....	£ 3	0	to	£ 4	10
Middlings.....	2	0	—	2	5
Chats.....	1	15	—	2	0
Common Red..	3	0	—	3	15
Onions..	0s.	0d.	—	0s.	0d.

HAY and STRAW, per Load.

Smithfield.—Hay...60s. to 84s.
Straw...50s. to 54s.
Clover...80s. to 90s.

St. James's.—Hay.....66s. to 84s.
Straw...51s. to 60s.
Clover...73s. to 84s.

Whitechapel.—Hay...70s. to 84s.
Straw...42s. to 56s.
Clover...84s. to 95s.

Price of HOPS, per Cwt. in the BOROUGH.

New Bags.

Kent....	£ 2	5	to	£ 4	0
Sussex....	2	2	—	2	10
Essex....	0	0	—	0	0
Yearling Bags.....	28s.	—	40s.		

New Pockets.

Kent....	£ 2	10	to	£ 4	0
Sussex....	2	6	—	2	16
Essex....	2	10	—	3	10
Farnham..	6	0	—	7	0
Yearling Pockets...	35s.	—	45s.		